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ACTION NEA-11

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 INR-10 EUR-12 SS-15 CIAE-00 DODE-00
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O 170518Z APR 81
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4370
INFO ANCONSUL KARACHI
ANCONSUL LAHORE POUCH
ANCONSUL PESHAWAR POUCH
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USMISSION USNATO

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

REVIEWED BY *[Signature]*

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DATE *3/14/81*

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BY *[Signature]*

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E.O. 12065: RDS-1 4/16/01 (RATTRAY, A.) OR-N
TAGS: PEPR MOPS SREF AP PK
SUBJECT: (S) PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN: AN MFA OVERVIEW

1. (S) ENTIRE TEXT. PLEASE PROTECT F.B.I.
2. SUMMARY: DURING MEETINGS AT MFA 16 APRIL, CODEL PRITCHARD RECEIVED AN OVERVIEW BRIEFING ON THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN; FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS RECAP ESSENTIAL POINTS:

END SUMMARY.

3. OPENED HIS PRESENTATION BY SUGGESTING THERE IS NO LIGHT AT THE END OF THE AFGHAN TUNNEL AT PRESENT. PAKISTAN HAS BEEN WORKING FEVERISHLY, HE SAID, TO GET SOME
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PROCESS UNDERWAY WHICH WILL LEAD IN THE END TO A

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POLITICAL SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM, BUT THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE SUCCESS THUS FAR. THERE HAS BEEN NO PROGRESS ON SUBSTANCE AND NOT EVEN AGREEMENT AMONG ALL CONCERNED ON PROCEDURAL MATTERS AFFECTING THE SEARCH FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. AMONG THE PROCEDURAL DIFFERENCES IMPEDING THE SEARCH HE CITED:

-- THE AFGHAN AND SOVIET PREFERENCE FOR PURELY BILATERAL TALKS, ALONG THE LINES OF THE DRA'S 14 MAY 1980 PROPOSALS WHICH CONNOTE AND WOULD CONSTITUTE RECOGNITION VS THE PREFERENCE OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE, THE IRANIANS, THE PAKISTANIS, ETC. FOR TRILATERAL TALKS;

-- THE AFGHAN (AND SOVIET) PERCEPTION THAT THE UN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AT SUCH TALKS TO BE A "HERE ONLOOKER," A "PRESENCE," VS THE PREFERENCE OF PAKISTAN AND OTHERS THAT HE BE AN ORGANIZER AND AN ACTIVE PARTICIPANT.

4. ON THE GROUND IN AFGHANISTAN ITSELF, THE SITUATION "IS NOT GETTING ANY BETTER," IN THE PAKISTANI VIEW. WITH THE ADVENT OF SPRING, THE PACE OF THE FIGHTING IS ON THE RISE. "WHAT HAS SURPRISED US," HE SAID, "IS THAT THE UPSURGE IN FIGHTING IS NOT TAKING PLACE IN THE AREA OPPOSITE THE PAKISTAN BORDER BUT RATHER FAR FROM PAKISTAN, IN THE NORTH AND NORTHWEST PART OF AFGHANISTAN NEAR THE IRANIAN AND THE RUSSIAN BORDERS." THIS IS "NOT DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND," HE ADDED. THE POPULATION IN THAT AREA HAS DIRECT LINKS, CULTURALLY AND LINGUISTICALLY, WITH THE CITIZENS OF SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA. THEY WERE ONCE-REFUGEES THEMSELVES FROM SOVIET PERSECUTION IN CENTRAL ASIA, AND "THEY HAVE A CERTAIN WAY OF LOOKING AT THE
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USSR...THEY HAVE NO ILLUSIONS." IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THEY WERE SLOW TO REACT TO THE INITIAL SOVIET THRUST INTO AFGHANISTAN BUT NOW ARE BETTER ORGANIZED AND PREPARED TO RESIST WHAT THE RUSSIANS ARE TRYING TO DO.

5. FIGHTING HAS ALSO BEEN HEAVY ON AN AXIS CONNECTING HERAT AND KANDAHAR, IN THE SOUTH. THE FIGHTING HERE REFLECTS PERHAPS THE FIRST SIGNS OF FAILURE, "DESPITE DETERMINED EFFORTS OVER THE LAST FEW MONTHS, OF A SOVIET/AFGHAN PROGRAM AIMED AT EXPANDING POLITICAL

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SUPPORT FOR THE KABUL REGIME." THIS PROGRAM, HAD A "REASONABLE CHANCE OF SUCCESS" WHEN IT WAS LAUNCHED. IT INVOLVED A LOWERING OF THE KABUL REGIME'S IDEOLOGICAL PROFILE, AS WELL AS NEGOTIATION OF SPECIFIC AGREEMENTS WITH TRIBAL LEADERS AIMED AT REASSURING THEM OF THEIR CULTURAL INTEGRITY AND FREEDOM AND BUYING THEM OFF WITH REWARDS AND OTHER INDUCEMENTS. HE REFERRED IN PARTICULAR TO THE REGIME'S DE-EMPHASIS OF THE WORD "PARTY" AND EMPHASIS ON THE WORD "FATHERLAND", AS IN THE "FATHERLAND FRONT", FORMED WITH SOME BALLYHOO WITH A COMMITTEE OF 35 TO GUIDE ITS PROGRAM.

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6.

7 EARLY SIGNS, HE ADDED, ARE THAT THE PROGRAM HAS FAILED. THE "SOVIETS" HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO MASK THE TRUTH OF THEIR INTENTIONS FROM THE LOCAL TRIBESMEN, WHO MAKE UP IN CUNNING WHAT THEY LACK IN SOPHISTICATION. ALSO THE SOVIETS AND THEIR KABUL PUPPETS FAILED TO ACCOUNT FOR TRADITIONAL TRIBAL GUILE. "AS HE AND THE BRITISH HAVE BOTH FOUND OUT TO

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OUR DISCOMFORT," HE SMILE, "TRIGESHEN WILL TAKE
MONEY, BUT THAT DOES NOT ALWAYS MEAN THEY WILL DO WHAT
YOU WANT OR STAY WITH YOU WHEN YOU NEED THEM."

7. THE BIG QUESTION NOW IS WHAT WILL THE SOVIETS/DRA
DO IF THIS PROGRAM CONTINUES TO FAIL? THEY COULD, OF
COURSE, GROW MORE FLEXIBLE, EXPANDING THE EFFORT TO WIN
OVER THE TRIBES; THEY COULD ADOPT A MORE MILITANT POSTURE,
WITH A RENEWED CAMPAIGN OF REPRESSION. "THE EVIDENCE IS
NOT AT ALL CONCLUSIVE AT PRESENT, BUT
INDICATIONS ARE THAT WE MIGHT BE ENTERING A VERY SERIOUS
PHASE," HE ASSERTED, WITH ESCALATING VIOLENCE AND THE
POSSIBILITY OF "DELIBERATE EXPULSION OF UNDESIRABLE
POPULATION FROM RURAL AREAS INTO THE TOWNS WHERE THEY CAN
BE BETTER CONTROLLED OR FROM THE COUNTRYSIDE ACROSS THE
BORDER INTO PAKISTAN AND IRAK."

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MEANWHILE, HE ADDED, THERE ARE VIRTUALLY NO AFGHAN TROOPS IN EVIDENCE IN KABUL; THEY HAVE EITHER GONE SOUTH OR NORTH. THOSE THAT HAVE GONE NORTH HAVE DEPLOYED TO THE PANJSHIR VALLEY, SUGGESTING A NEW REPRESSION THERE AS WELL.

9. EITHER WAY THE RUSSIANS GO ON THIS, PAKISTAN EXPECTS THE REFUGEE FLOW, WHICH HAS RISEN SHARPLY IN RECENT MONTHS, TO CONTINUE HEAVY, PERHAPS RISING STILL FURTHER WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF A TOTAL OF 3 MILLION REFUGEES BY THE END OF 1981. COUPLED WITH AN ESTIMATED ONE MILLION MORE IN IRAN, THIS COULD MEAN 4 MILLION TOTAL REFUGEES FROM A COUNTRY OF ABOUT 15 MILLION POPULATION IN APRIL 1978. (IN AN ASIDE, HE SAID THE IRANIANS DO NOT KNOW HOW MANY REFUGEES THEY HAVE; THEY SAY THEY HAVE NO ORGANIZATION TO HANDLE REFUGEES ON THEIR SIDE AND HAVE NO REGISTRATION FIGURES FROM WHICH TO MAKE ESTIMATES. BANI SAHR TOLD THERE MAY BE AS MANY AS 1.5 MILLION AFGHAN REFUGEES IN IRAN WHEN THEY MET LAST MONTH.)

B/a 3/5-

10. A DELIBERATE CAMPAIGN TO EXPEL POPULATION "SHACKS OF A NAZI-TYPE FINAL SOLUTION," BUT HE DOUBTS THE SOVIETS WOULD BE DETERRED FROM DOING THIS IF THEY THOUGHT THEY HAD TO.

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11. A CONTINUED RISE IN THE REFUGEE POPULATION IN PAKISTAN WOULD POSE A SPECIAL SORT OF PROBLEM OF ITS OWN FOR THE GOP. THE ASSUMPTION WHICH THE GOP HAS OPERATED UNDER THUS FAR HAS BEEN THAT THE REFUGEE FLOW COULD BE ACCOMMODATED WITHIN THE TWO PROVINCES ALONG THE

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AFGHANISTAN BORDER, I.E., BALUCHISTAN AND THE NORTHWEST FRONTIER PROVINCE. A REFUGEE POPULATION OF 3 MILLION MIGHT WELL CHALLENGE THIS ASSUMPTION AND REQUIRE SETTLEMENT ON THIS SIDE OF THE INDUS RIVER. IT WOULD CERTAINLY STRETCH PAKISTAN'S FINANCIAL ABILITY TO COPE -- LET ALONE THE POLITICAL PROBLEMS -- WITH SUCH NUMBERS. "PAKISTAN APPRECIATES THE HELP BEING PROVIDED BY THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, BUT EVEN WITH THAT HELP PAKISTAN MUST BEAR ABOUT HALF THE COST, I.E., \$200 MILLION OF THE TOTAL \$400 MILLION COST THIS YEAR. A WORKING ASSUMPTION OF EVEN 2.6 MILLION

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REFUGEES PROJECTS AN OVERALL COST OF \$600 MILLION."
"IF THAT DARK PROSPECT MATERIALIZES, THE SCOPE OF INTERNATIONAL AID MUST GO UP," HE ADDED GRINLY.

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_____ BUT THEY SHOULD ALSO BE
SENSITIZED TO THE CONTINUING COSTS OF THEIR AFGHAN
ADVENTURE. THERE ARE OCCASIONAL SIGNALS, HE ADDED, THAT
THEY ARE MINDFUL THAT THEY HAVE VIOLATED INTERNATIONAL
NORMS; HE CITED THE BREZHNEV PROPOSAL FOR THE GULF AND
HIS SPEECH ALSO AT THE PARTY CONGRESS AS POSSIBLE
SIGNALS. BUT THESE DO NOT GO FAR ENOUGH.

--FINALLY, INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE IS HELPFUL IN MAINTAIN-
ING INTERNATIONAL AWARENESS OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE
THE AFGHAN REFUGEE PROBLEM. THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE EFFORT
"HAS NOT BEEN BAD," HE SAID. "BUT IT HAS REQUIRED BACK-
BREAKING WORK AT EVERY STAGE...THEY ARE AWARE...THEY ARE
SYMPATHETIC...BUT WE NEED TO KEEP REMINDING THEM OF THE
PROBLEM, JUST AS WE NEED TO KEEP REMINDING THE REST
OF THE WORLD." IN REPLY TO A QUESTION, HE ACKNOWLEDGED
THAT THE IRAN-IRAG WAR HAS DISTRACTED THE ATTENTIONS OF
THE ISLAMIC WORLD FROM AFGHANISTAN AND THE PROBLEM OF
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REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN.
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